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Abstract  This paper examines an endogenous timing game in product differentiated duopolies 
under price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show 
that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium outcome in a 
private duopoly under significant (insignificant) environmental externality, but this result can be 
reversed in a mixed duopoly. We also show that when environmental externalities are significant, 
public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and that public leadership is 
more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that 
privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare. 
Keywords: Emission tax; Endogenous timing; Mixed duopoly; Private duopoly 
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1  Introduction 
The earlier literature on duopolistic competition analyzes the endogenous market structure 
based on whether firms endogenously decide on prices or quantities and whether such decisions 
are made sequentially or simultaneously. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) formulated an 
observable delay game and showed that in a private duopoly with symmetric payoffs, firms 
decide simultaneously when competing in quantities and sequentially when competing in prices. 
However, in the literature on mixed duopolies with asymmetric payoffs, where a profit-
maximizing private firm competes with a welfare-maximizing public firm, Pal (1998) and 
Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) showed that the results are surprisingly reversed: firms decide sequentially 
when competing in quantities and simultaneously when competing in prices.1 
Besides understanding these conflicting results, recent concerns over environmental quality 
                                                          
1 Lu (2006), Lu and Poddar (2009) and Heywood and Ye (2009) extended the analysis into a mixed 
market where a public firm competes with domestic and foreign private firms and obtained similar results. 
For more extensive analysis, see Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2010), Tomaru and Kiyono (2010), Balogh 
and Tasnadi (2012), Amir and Feo (2014), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Naya (2015) and Din and Sun 
(2016) among others.  
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suggest the need for further examination of what allows for environmental externalities and for 
the possibility of considering public policies such as emission tax or privatization.2 In the 
presence of environmental externalities, the analysis of mixed oligopolies has been prominent 
and thus the possible benefits of public ownership have also motivated recent analyses on mixed 
markets.3 For example, Pal and Saha (2014, 2015) and Xu et al. (2016) have recently explored 
the interaction between privatization and emission tax in order to explain how privatization 
policies and emission tax affect environmental damage and social welfare. However, previous 
studies on environmental issues consider an exogenously fixed timing game and hence have 
very restrictive implications. 
This paper is the first to investigate an endogenous timing game in private and mixed 
duopolies with environmental externalities and emission taxes. Specifically, we examine an 
observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in product-differentiated 
duopoly markets under price competition when an emission tax is imposed on environmental 
externality. We find that most results in both private and mixed duopolies in the literature 
without externalities still hold only when environmental externalities are insignificant. For 
instance, we show that the equilibrium under price competition with an emission tax is a 
sequential-move outcome in a private duopoly, which is consistent with Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990), but a simultaneous-move outcome in a mixed duopoly, which is consistent with 
Bárcena-Ruiz (2007). 
However, when environmental externalities are significant, the results are surprisingly 
reversed in both private and mixed duopolies. We show that the equilibrium under price 
competition with an emission tax is a simultaneous-move outcome in a private duopoly but a 
sequential-move outcome in a mixed duopoly. This is in sharp contrast to the results in the 
previous literature under price competition without externalities. Therefore, policies concerning 
environmental quality have a significant effect on the endogenous timing that firms choose for 
production. This implies that in a mixed duopoly under price competition, the analysis of a 
                                                          
2 In most countries, mixed markets exist in a broad range of industries such as oil, gas, automobile, steel, 
chemical, telecommunication, electricity, power plant, and hospital industries, which emit pollutants in 
the production process. In particular, many state-owned industries in transition economies have relied on 
highly polluting technologies. Furthermore, EU countries lead the development of environmental policies 
for the sustainability in a warming planet and have a non-negligible presence of public enterprises in 
energy-consuming industries such as transportation and automobile industries. More related descriptions 
can be found in Wang and Wang (2009), Pal and Saha (2014, 2015) and Xu, et al. (2016). 
3 Several researchers have recently analyzed the environmental concerns of a mixed market. Beladi and 
Chao (2006), Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006), Ohori (2006), Cato (2008), Wang and Wang (2009), and 
Xu and Lee (2015) provide various discussions on mixed markets. Recently, Clo, et al (2016) supports the 
positive effect of public ownership on environmental performance in European electricity industry during 
the two decades since the market-based instrument is introduced in 1980s. 
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simultaneous-move game can be problematic when environmental externality is significant. 
When environmental externalities are significant, we also find that public leadership yields 
greater welfare than private leadership; moreover, public leadership is more robust than private 
leadership as an equilibrium outcome. These results are in sharp contrast to those in mixed 
duopolies without environmental externalities. Pal (1998), Matsumura (2003), and Matsumura 
and Ogawa (2010) showed that private leadership is more robust and more efficient. However, 
significant externalities can change the equilibrium outcome between private and public 
leaderships. 
Finally, we investigate an endogenous choice on privatization in order to examine the 
welfare effect of privatization. We find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming 
a private leader, but this worsens welfare. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a product-
differentiated duopoly model in price competition with environmental externalities. Sections 3 
and 4 analyze an endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies, respectively. Section 
5 examines an endogenous choice on privatization. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2  The model  
We consider a standard differentiated duopoly with linear demand in Sing and Vives (1984), 
where a representative consumer’s utility function is given by 
ܷሺݍ଴, ݍଵሻ ൌ ܣሺݍ଴ ൅ ݍଵሻ െ ଵଶ ሺݍ଴ଶ ൅ 2ܾݍ଴ݍଵ ൅ ݍଵଶሻ,           (1) 
where iq  is the output of each firm and ܾ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሻ  measures the degree of product 
differentiation. A higher value of b  represents a lower degree of product differentiation, or 
higher substitutability. 
The inverse demand function of each firm is ݌௜ ൌ ܣ െ ݍ௜ െ ܾݍ௝ , 0,1i j  , i j , 
where ip  is the market price of product i. Then, consumer surplus is represented by 
CS ൌ ଵଶ ሺݍ଴ଶ ൅ 2ܾݍ଴ݍଵ ൅ ݍଵଶሻ . Note that higher substitutability reduces a consumer’s 
willingness to pay for each product but increases consumer surplus. The direct demand function 
of each firm is expressed as 
ݍ଴ ൌ ஺ି஺௕ି௣బା௕௣భଵି௕మ , ݍଵ ൌ
஺ି஺௕ା௕௣బି௣భ
ଵି௕మ .        (2)  
We assume that both firms have identical technologies and that the production cost 
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function takes the quadratic form ܥሺݍ௜ሻ ൌ ܨ ൅ ௤೔
మ
ଶ , where 0F   without loss of generality.  
In both firms, production leads to pollution ie , but each firm can reduce pollution by 
undertaking abatement activities. Suppose that firm i chooses pollution abatement level ia ; 
then, the emission level of each firm is reduced to ݁௜ ൌ ݍ௜ െ ܽ௜ by investing an amount of ௔೔
మ
ଶ  
in abatement activities.4 The extent of environmental damage due to industrial pollution may be 
given by i
i
ED d e  . The government imposes an environmental tax on the emission level, 
for which the tax rate is t . The resulting total tax revenue is i
i
T t e  .  
The profit of firm i is given by 
ߨ௜ ൌ ݌௜ݍ௜ െ ௤೔
మ
ଶ െ ݐ݁௜ െ
௔೔మ
ଶ ,			݅ ൌ 0, 1.        (3) 
Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus CS , the profit of both firms 1o  , and 
tax revenue T , minus environmental damage ED : 
ܹ ൌ ܥܵ ൅ ߨ଴ ൅ ߨଵ ൅ ܶ െ ܧܦ.        (4) 
The game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) proceeds as follows. In the first 
stage, each firm simultaneously chooses whether to move early or late. The basic game played 
is simultaneous if both firms choose the same period, and sequential otherwise. In the following, 
we examine respectively a private duopoly where both private firms compete in price and a 
mixed duopoly where one private firm and one public firm compete, and we compare the results. 
3  Private Duopoly 
In this section, we first consider a fixed-timing game in private duopolies with two firms 
competing in prices in a simultaneous-move game and in a sequential-move game, respectively. 
We then examine the first stage in an endogenous-timing game. 
3.1  Simultaneous-move game 
In this game, each firm chooses its price and abatement level simultaneously and independently. 
Assuming interior solutions and simultaneously solving the first-order conditions for 
                                                          
4 For simplicity of tractability, in line with the literature (Wang and Wang, 2009; Pal and Saha, 2015; Xu 
et al., 2016), we focus on end-of-pipe abatement, which is additively separable. Implicitly, we assume that 
both products emit the same type of pollutants. 
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maximizing the profits of both firms in (3), we obtain the following equilibrium prices and 
abatement levels: 
݌଴ ൌ ݌ଵ ൌ ଶ஺ି஺௕
మା௧ା௕௧
ଷା௕ି௕మ ,	ܽ଴ ൌ ܽଵ ൌ ݐ.  
The social welfare in equilibrium is 
ܹ ൌ ஺మሺସା௕ିଶ௕మሻିଶ஺ሺଷା௕ି௕మሻௗାଶସௗିଶሺଵି௕ሻሺ஺ା஺௕ି଻௕ௗି௕మௗା௕యௗሻ௧ିଶሺଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕రሻ௧మሺଷା௕ି௕మሻమ .(5) 
Differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax in 
a simultaneous-move Bertrand game in Private duopolies (BP):5 
ݐ஻௉ ൌ ൝
ଵଶௗିሺଵି௕ሻሺ஺ሺଵା௕ሻି௕ௗሺ଻ା௕ି௕మሻሻ
ଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕ర 		݂݅	݀ ൐ ݀ଵ
	0																																																					݂݅		݀ ൑ ݀ଵ
,      (6 ) 
where ݀ଵ is as presented in Appendix A.6 Note that when ݀ ൐ ݀ଵ, the optimal emission tax is 
increasing in both the degree of production differentiation, ߲ݐ஻௉ ߲ܾ⁄ ൐ 0 , and marginal 
environmental damage, ߲ݐ஻௉ ߲݀⁄ ൐ 0. However, it is lower than the marginal environmental 
damage, 0 ൏ ݐ஻௉ ൏ ݀ for (0,1)b .  
In the first case, when ݀ ൐ ݀ଵ, we obtain the equilibrium prices, abatement levels, and 
quantities of the two firms, as presented in Appendix B.7 The equilibrium profit of the private 
firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively,  
ߨ଴஻௉ ൌ ߨଵ஻௉ ൌ ௠భଶሺଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕రሻమ , ܧܦ஻௉ ൌ
ଶௗሺ஺ሺହା௕ିଶ௕మሻିሺସା௕ି௕మሻమௗሻ
ଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕ర ݀, 
ܹ஻௉ ൌ ஺మሺହା௕ିଶ௕మሻିଶ஺ௗሺହା௕ିଶ௕మሻାሺସା௕ି௕మሻమௗమଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕ర .     (7) 
In the second case, when ݀ ൑ ݀ଵ, the optimal emission tax is zero. The equilibrium profit 
of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively, 
ߨ଴஻௉ ൌ ߨଵ஻௉ ൌ ஺
మሺଷିଶ௕మሻ
ଶሺଷା௕ି௕మሻమ, ܧܦ஻௉ ൌ
ଶ஺ௗ
ଷା௕ି௕మ, 
ܹ஻௉ ൌ ஺ሺ஺ሺସା௕ିଶ௕మሻିଶሺଷା௕ି௕మሻௗሻሺଷା௕ି௕మሻమ         (8) 
                                                          
5 Note that the optimal emission tax can be negative when environmental externality is insignificant 
under duopolistic competition. Note also that the equilibrium abatement level becomes zero when a non-
positive emission tax is imposed. In order to eliminate this trivial and unrealistic situation, we focus on 
non-negative emission taxes in the remaining analysis.  
6 For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide ݀௜, ݉௜, and ݊௜ in Appendix A.  
7 For the sake of expositional convenience, we provide ݌௜, ܽ௜, and ݍ௜ in Appendix B. 
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3.2  Sequential-move game 
In this game, first firm 0 and then firm 1 choose their price and abatement levels sequentially. 
Then, assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of firm 1 to maximize its profits in 
(3) provide the following reaction function: 
ଵܲ ൌ ሺଵି௕ሻ൫஺൫௕
మିଶ൯ିሺଵା௕ሻ௧൯ି௕ሺଶି௕మሻ௣బ
ିଷାଶ௕మ ,		ܽଵ ൌ ݐ.       (9) 
Now, the first-order conditions of firm 0 to maximize its profits in (3) with the reaction 
function of firm 1 in (9) provide the following equilibrium prices and abatement levels: 
଴ܲ ൌ ଷ஺ሺଶି௕
మሻሺଷି௕ି௕మሻାሺଷାଶ௕ሻሺଷିଷ௕మା௕యሻ௧
ଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕ర , ܽ଴ ൌ ݐ.           
݌ଵ ൌ ஺ሺଶି௕
మሻሺଽିଷ௕ିସ௕మା௕యሻାሺଽା଺௕ି଻௕మିହ௕యା௕రା௕ఱሻ௧
ଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕ర  , ܽଵ ൌ ݐ. 
The social welfare in equilibrium is 
ܹ ൌ ௠మሺଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕రሻమ.                (10)  
Differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission tax 
in a sequential-move Leadership game in Private duopolies (LP): 
ݐ௅௉ ൌ ቊ
௠య
ଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ 		݂݅	݀ ൐ ݀ଶ
	0																																																																																								݂݅		݀ ൑ ݀ଶ
                (11) 
Note that when ݀ ൐ ݀ଶ , the optimal emission tax also increases in both the degree of 
production differentiation, ߲ݐ௅௉ ߲ܾ⁄ ൐ 0, and marginal environmental damage, ߲ݐ௅௉ ߲݀⁄ ൐ 0. 
Note also that it is lower than the marginal environmental damage, 0 ൏ ݐ௅௉ ൏ ݀, for (0,1)b . 
In the first case, when ݀ ൐ ݀ଶ, the equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental 
damage, and welfare are, respectively, 
ߨ଴௅௉ ൌ ௠ల଼ሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻሻమ,  
ߨଵ௅௉ ൌ ௠ళ଼ሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻሻమ,  
ܧܦ௅௉ ൌ ஺ሺଵ଺ଶ଴ି଻ହ଺௕ିଶଶ଺଼௕మାଽଶସ௕యାଵଵଵ଺௕రିଷ଺଼௕ఱିଶଶ଴௕లାସ଼௕ళାଵଷ௕ఴሻିሺ଻ଶି଺௕ିହ଼௕మାଶ௕యାଵଵ௕రሻమௗଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ ݀, 
ܹ௅௉ ൌ ௠ఴସሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ.               (12) 
In the second case, when ݀ ൑ ݀ଶ, the optimal emission tax is zero. The equilibrium profit 
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of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, respectively, 
ߨ଴௅௉ ൌ ஺
మሺଷି௕ି௕మሻమ
ଶሺଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕రሻ, ߨଵ௅௉ ൌ
஺మሺଷିଶ௕మሻሺଽିଷ௕ିସ௕మା௕యሻమ
ଶሺଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕రሻమ , ܧܦ௅௉ ൌ
஺ሺଵ଼ି଺௕ିଵ଴௕మାଶ௕యା௕రሻௗ
ଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕ర ,  
ܹ௅௉ ൌ ஺మሺଷଶସିଵଷହ௕ିସ଼଺௕మାଵ଼ଷ௕యାଶହଵ௕రି଻ଽ௕ఱିହଵ௕లାଵଵ௕ళାଷ௕ఴሻିሺଷି௕మሻሺଽିହ௕మሻሺଵ଼ି଺௕ିଵ଴௕మାଶ௕యା௕రሻ୅ୢሺଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕రሻమ . (13) 
3.3  Comparison 
Proposition 1 In private duopolies, the optimal emission tax is lower than marginal 
environmental damage, and its level in sequential-move games is lower than that in simultaneous-
move games. 
Proof: Comparing the values, we have ݀ଵ ൏ ݀ଶ. Thus, (i) when 0 ൑ ݀ ൑ ݀ଵ, ݐ௅௉ ൌ ݐ஻௉ ൌ 0; 
(ii) when ݀ଵ ൏ ݀ ൑ ݀ଶ, ݐ௅௉ ൌ 0 ൏ ݐ஻௉; and (iii) when ݀ ൐ ݀ଶ, 0 ൏ ݐ௅௉ ൏ ݐ஻௉. Q.E.D. 
This implies that a simultaneous-move game produces more output and thus more emission and 
higher welfare in price competition. Thus, we have the following proposition.  
Proposition 2 In private duopolies, environmental damage and social welfare are lower in a 
sequential-move game. 
Proof: We can easily show that ܧܦ௅௉ ൏ ܧܦ஻௉ and ܹ௅௉ ൏ ܹ஻௉. Q.E.D. 
3.4  Endogenous timing game 
We now discuss the first-stage choice in an endogenous timing game under price competition in 
private duopolies. Each firm i (i = 0,1) simultaneously chooses whether to move early ( ௜ܶ = 1) or 
late ( ௜ܶ	= 2). If both firms choose the same period, the equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game. 
Otherwise, the equilibrium is a sequential-move game. Table 1 provides the payoff matrix of the 
observable delay game in private duopolies.  
Table 1: Payoff matrix in private duopolies 
Firm 0 /1 ଵܶ = 1 ଵܶ = 2 
଴ܶ = 1 0 1( , )BP BP    0 1( , )LP LP   
଴ܶ = 2 1 0( , )LP LP   0 1( , )BP BP   
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Proposition 3 In private duopolies,  
(i) when ݀ ∈ ሾ0, ݀ଷሻ, two sequential-move outcomes, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,2ሻ and ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,1ሻ, 
are the unique equilibrium outcomes. 
(ii) when ݀ ൌ ݀ଷ, two sequential-move outcomes, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,2ሻ, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,1ሻ, and one 
simultaneous-move outcome, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,2ሻ, are the equilibrium outcomes; 
(iii) when ݀ ∈ ሺ݀ଷ, ݀ସሻ, one simultaneous-move outcome, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,2ሻ, is the equilibrium 
outcome; 
(iv) otherwise, two simultaneous-move outcomes, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,1ሻ and ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,2ሻ, are the 
equilibrium outcomes. 
Proof: Comparing the values, we have ݀ଶ ൏ ݀ଷ ൏ ݀ସ. Then, the profit ranks are as follows: (i) 
ߨ଴஻௉ ൌ ߨଵ஻௉ ழவ ߨ଴௅௉ if ݀
ழ
வ ݀ଷ; and (ii) ߨ଴஻௉ ൌ ߨଵ஻௉
ழ
வ ߨଵ௅௉ if ݀
ழ
வ ݀ସ. Q.E.D.  
The proposition represents that private duopolies in price competition with optimal emission tax 
yield a sequential-move outcome in equilibrium when the environmental externality is 
insignificant. This result is consistent with the observable delay game without environmental 
externality, as formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). On the other hand, under price 
competition with significant environmental externality, a simultaneous-move outcome appears 
in equilibrium, which is sharply different from the previous results when environmental 
externality is not considered. 
4  Mixed duopoly 
In this section, we examine a mixed duopoly in which firm 0 is a welfare-maximizing public 
firm and firm 1 is a profit-maximizing private firm. Similarly, we first consider fixed timing 
games in mixed duopolies where both public and private firms compete in prices in a 
simultaneous-move game and in two different sequential-move games, public leadership and 
private leadership. We then examine the endogenous timing game.  
4.1  Simultaneous-move game 
In this game, both firms choose their prices and abatement levels simultaneously and 
independently. Assuming interior solutions, we simultaneously solve the first-order conditions 
of firm 0 to maximize welfare in (4) and those of firm 1 to maximize its profits in (3), to obtain 
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the following equilibrium prices and abatement levels: 
݌଴ ൌ ஺൫ଷିଶ௕
మି௕యା௕ర൯ାሺଵି௕ሻ൫ଷିଶ௕మ൯ௗା௕൫ଷି௕మ൯௧
଺ିସ௕మା௕ర , 
	݌ଵ ൌ ൫ଶି௕
మ൯ሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗሻାଶ௧
଺ିସ௕మା௕ర , 
	ܽ଴ ൌ ݀, ܽଵ ൌ ݐ.  
The social welfare in equilibrium is 
ܹ ൌ ௡భଶሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕రሻమ.                (14) 
Then, differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission 
tax in a simultaneous-move Bertrand game in Mixed duopolies (BM): 
ݐ஻ெ ൌ ൝
ଶ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺ௕ିଵሻሺଵା௕ሻା൫ସ଼ିଶ௕ିହସ௕మାଶ௕యାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ൯ௗ
ସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ 		݂݅	݀ ൐ ݀ହ
	0																																																																																											݂݅		݀ ൑ ݀ହ
 .            (15) 
Note that when ݀ ൐ ݀ହ, the optimal emission tax is increasing in both the degree of production 
differentiation, ߲ݐ஻ெ ߲ܾ⁄ ൐ 0, and marginal environmental damage, ߲ݐ஻ெ ߲݀⁄ ൐ 0. However, 
it is lower than the marginal environmental damage, 0 ൏ ݐ஻ெ ൏ ݀ for (0,1)b .  
In the first case, when ݀ ൐ ݀ହ, we obtain the equilibrium prices, abatement levels, and 
quantities of the two firms. Note that the price of the public firm is lower than that of the private 
firm, whereas the output of the public firm is larger; that is, ݌଴஻ெ ൏ ݌ଵ஻ெand ݍ଴஻ெ ൐ ݍଵ஻ெ. This 
shows that the public firm sets a lower price than the private firm, which does not consider 
consumer surplus. Furthermore, the abatement of the public firm is larger than that of the 
private firm, which does not consider environmental damage, ܽ଴஻ெ ൐ ܽଵ஻ெ. 
The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, 
respectively, as follows: 
ߨଵ஻ெ ൌ ௡మଶሺସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴሻమ,       
ܧܦ஻ெ ൌ ஺ሺସଶିଶସ௕ିଷ଴௕మାଶ଴௕యାଽ௕రି଻௕ఱି௕లା௕ళሻିௗሺଵଷ଴ିଶସ௕ିଵଷ଴௕మାଶ଴௕యା଺ହ௕రି଻௕ఱିଵ଻௕లା௕ళାଶ௕ఴሻସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ ݀,  
ܹ஻ெ ൌ ௡యସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ.                (16) 
In the second case, when ݀ ൑ ݀ହ, the optimal emission tax is zero. This yields the 
following results in equilibrium: 
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ߨଵ஻ெ ൌ ሺଷିଶ௕
మሻሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗሻమ
ଶሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕రሻమ , 
ܧܦ஻ெ ൌ ஺ሺହିଷ௕ି௕మା௕యሻିሺଽିସ௕ିସ௕మା௕యା௕రሻௗ଺ିସ௕మା௕ర ݀, 
ܹ஻ெ ൌ ௡రଶሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕రሻమ.               (17) 
4.2  Sequential-move game with public leadership  
In this game, first the public firm and then the private firm choose their price and abatement 
levels sequentially. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of firm 1 to maximize 
its profits in (3) provide the reaction function in (9). Then, the welfare-maximizing prices and 
pollution abatement levels of the public firm in the second stage yield the following: 
݌଴ ൌ ஺ሺଽିଶ௕ି଻௕
మାଶ௕రሻାሺଷି௕ି௕మሻሺଷିଶ௕మሻௗା௕ሺହିଶ௕మሻ௧
ଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ , ܽ଴ ൌ ݀.               
݌ଵ ൌ ሺଶି௕
మሻሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଷି௕మሻା௕ሺଷ௕ି௕మሻௗሻାሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕రሻ௧
ଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ , 	ܽଵ ൌ ݐ. 
The social welfare in equilibrium is  
ܹ ൌ ௡ఱସሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ.                (18) 
Now, differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission 
tax in a sequential-move public Leadership in Mixed duopolies (LM): 
ݐ௅ெ ൌ ൝
஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺ௕ିଵሻሺଵା௕ሻାሺଶସି௕ିଵଽ௕మା௕యାସ௕రሻௗ
ଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర 		݂݅	݀ ൐ ݀଺
	0																																																																						݂݅		݀ ൑ ݀଺
.             (19) 
Note that when ݀ ൐ ݀଺, the optimal emission tax is increasing in both the degree of production 
differentiation, ߲ݐ௅ெ ߲ܾ⁄ ൐ 0, and degree of marginal environmental damage, ߲ݐ௅ெ ߲݀⁄ ൐ 0. 
Note also that it is lower than the marginal environmental damage,	0 ൏ ݐ௅ெ ൏ ݀, for (0,1)b . 
In the first case, when	݀ ൐ ݀଺, the price of the public firm is lower than that of the private 
firm, whereas the output of the public firm is larger; that is, ݌଴௅ெ ൏ ݌ଵ௅ெand ݍ଴௅ெ ൐ ݍଵ௅ெ. 
Furthermore, the abatement of the public firm is larger than that of the private firm, ܽ଴௅ெ ൐ ܽଵ௅ெ. 
The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, 
respectively,  
ߨଵ௅ெ ൌ ௡లଶሺଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕రሻమ,      
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ܧܦ௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଶଵିଵ଴௕ିଵ଴௕మାସ௕యା௕రሻିௗሺ଺ହିଵ଴௕ିସସ௕మାସ௕యାଽ௕రሻଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర ݀,  
ܹ௅ெ ൌ ஺మሺଶଵିଵ଴௕ିଵ଴௕మାସ௕యା௕రሻିଶ஺ௗሺଶଵିଵ଴௕ିଵ଴௕మାସ௕యା௕రሻାሺ଺ହିଵ଴௕ିସସ௕మାସ௕యାଽ௕రሻௗమଶሺଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕రሻ   (20) 
In the second case, when ݀ ൑ ݀଺, the optimal emission tax is zero. This yields the 
following results in equilibrium:  
ߨଵ௅ெ ൌ ሺଷିଶ௕
మሻሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଷି௕మሻା௕ሺଷି௕ି௕మሻௗሻమ
଼ሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻమ ,  
ܧܦ௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଵହି଻௕ି଼௕మାଷ௕యା௕రሻିሺଶ଻ି଺௕ିଶଵ௕మାଶ௕యାହ௕రሻௗଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ ݀,  
ܹ௅ெ ൌ ஺మሺଵ଻ି଼௕ିଵ଴௕మାସ௕యା௕రሻିଶ஺ሺଵହି଻௕ି଼௕మାଷ௕యା௕రሻௗାሺଶ଻ି଺௕ିଶଵ௕మାଶ௕యାହ௕రሻௗమସሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ .     (21) 
4.3  Sequential-move game with private leadership  
In this game, first the private firm and then the public firm choose their price and abatement 
levels sequentially. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of firm 0 to maximize 
the welfare in (4) provide the following reaction function: 
଴ܲ ൌ ሺଵି௕ሻ
మሺ஺ାௗା௕ௗሻା௕ሺଷି௕మሻ௣భ
ଶ ,		ܽ଴ ൌ ݀.              (22) 
Then, the profit-maximizing price and pollution abatement level of the private firm in the 
second stage yield the following results: 
ଵܲ ൌ ሺସି௕
మሻሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗሻିଶሺଶି௕మሻ௧
ଵଶି଼௕మା௕ర , ܽଵ ൌ ݐ, 
଴ܲ ൌ ஺ሺ଺ିସ௕
మା௕యሻାሺଵି௕ሻሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕రሻௗା௕ሺ଺ିହ௕మା௕రሻ௧
ଵଶି଼௕మା௕ర ,		ܽ଴ ൌ ݀.  
The social welfare in equilibrium is 
 ܹ ൌ ௡ళଶሺଵଶି଼௕మା௕రሻమ.                (23) 
Now, differentiating social welfare with respect to t yields the following optimal emission 
tax in a sequential-move private leadership (or public Followership) Mixed duopolies (FM): 
ݐிெ ൌ ൝
ସ஺ሺ௕ିଶሻାሺଽ଺ିସ௕ି଻ଶ௕మାଵ଺௕రି௕లሻௗ
ሺଶି௕మሻሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻ 		݂݅	݀ ൐ ݀଻
	0																																																								݂݅		݀ ൑ ݀଻
.             (24) 
In the first case when ݀ ൐ ݀଻, the optimal emission tax first increases and then decreases as the 
degree of production differentiation increases; that is, ߲ݐிெ ߲ܾ⁄ ൒ 0 if 0 ൏ ܾ ൑ 0.35 and 
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߲ݐிெ ߲ܾ⁄ ൑ 0 if 0.35 ൑ ܾ ൏ 1. However, it is lower than the marginal environmental damage 
and increases as the marginal environmental damage increases; that is, 0 ൏ ݐிெ ൏ ݀ and 
߲ݐிெ ߲݀⁄ ൐ 0  for (0,1)b . 
When we substitute ݐிெ into ip , ia , and iq , the price of the public firm is lower than 
that of the private firm, but the output of the public firm is larger than that of the private firm; 
that is, ଴ܲிெ ൏ ଵܲிெ and ݍ଴ிெ ൐ ݍଵிெ. Furthermore, the abatement of the public firm is larger than 
that of the private firm, ܽ଴ிெ ൐ ܽଵிெ.  
The equilibrium profit of the private firm, environmental damage, and welfare are, 
respectively,  
ߨଵிெ ൌ ௡ఴଶሺଶି௕మሻమሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻమ, 
ܧܦிெ ൌ ଶ஺ሺସଶିଶସ௕ିଶଵ௕మାଵଵ௕యାଶ௕రି௕ఱሻିଶௗሺଵଷ଴ିଶସ௕ିଽଷ௕మାଵଵ௕యାଵ଼௕రି௕ఱି௕లሻሺଶି௕మሻሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻ ݀,  
ܹிெ ൌ ௡వሺଶି௕మሻమሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻ               (25) 
In the second case, when ݀ ൑ ݀଻, the optimal emission tax is zero. This yields the 
following results in equilibrium:  
ߨଵிெ ൌ ሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗሻ
మ
ଶሺଵଶି଼௕మା௕రሻ , 
ܧܦிெ ൌ ଶ஺ሺହିଷ௕ିଶ௕మା௕యሻିሺଵ଼ି଼௕ି଼௕మାଷ௕యሻௗଵଶି଼௕మା௕ర ݀, 
ܹிெ ൌ ௡భబଶሺଵଶି଼௕మା௕రሻమ.               (26) 
4.4  Comparison 
Proposition 4 In mixed duopolies, the optimal emission tax is lower than marginal environmental 
damage, but its level in the public (private) leadership game is the highest (lowest). 
Proof: Comparing the values, we have ݀଺ ൏ ݀ହ ൏ ݀଻. Thus, (i) when 0 ൑ ݀ ൑ ݀଺, ݐிெ ൌ
ݐ஻ெ ൌ ݐ௅ெ ൌ 0; (ii) when ݀଺ ൏ ݀ ൏ ݀ହ , ݐிெ ൌ ݐ஻ெ ൌ 0 ൏ ݐ௅ெ ; (iii) when ݀ହ ൑ ݀ ൏ ݀଻ , 
ݐிெ ൌ 0 ൏ ݐ஻ெ ൏ ݐ௅ெ; and (iv) when ݀ ൒ ݀଻, 0 ൏ ݐிெ ൏ ݐ஻ெ ൏ ݐ௅ெ. Q.E.D. 
This implies that public leadership in a sequential-move game produces more output and thus 
more emission and higher welfare in price competition. Thus, we have the following proposition.  
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Proposition 5 In mixed duopolies, environmental damage and social welfare are the highest 
(lowest) in a public (private) leadership game.  
Proof: Comparing the results, we can show that ܧܦிெ ൏ ܧܦ஻ெ ൏ ܧܦ௅ெ  and ܹிெ ൏
ܹ஻ெ ൏ ܹ௅ெ. Q.E.D. 
4.5  Endogenous timing game 
We now discuss the first-stage choice in an endogenous timing game under price competition in 
mixed duopolies. Table 2 provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game in mixed 
duopolies.  
Table 2: Payoff matrix in mixed duopolies 
Firm 0 /1 ଵܶ = 1 ଵܶ = 2 
଴ܶ = 1 1( , )BP BPW    1( , )LP LPW   
଴ܶ = 2 1( , )FP FPW   1( , )BP BPW   
Proposition 6 In mixed duopolies, 
(i) when ݀ ∈ ሾ0, ଼݀ሻ , one simultaneous-move outcome, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,1ሻ , is the unique 
equilibrium outcome; 
(ii) when ݀ ൌ ଼݀, one simultaneous-move outcome,	ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,1ሻ, and one sequential-move 
outcome in which the public is the leader, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,2ሻ, are the equilibrium outcomes; 
(iii) otherwise, one sequential-move outcome in which the public is the leader,	ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,2ሻ, is 
the equilibrium outcome. 
Proof: Comparing the values, we have ݀଻ ൏ ݀ଽ ൏ ଼݀ . From Proposition 5, we also have 
ܹிெ ൏ ܹ஻ெ ൏ ܹ௅ெ. Finally, the profit ranks of the private firm are as follows: (i) ߨଵ஻ெ வழߨଵ௅ெ 
if ݀ ழவ ଼݀; and (ii) ߨଵிெ
வ
ழߨଵ஻ெ if ݀
ழ
வ ݀ଽ. Q.E.D. 
The proposition represents that mixed duopolies in price competition with optimal emission tax 
yield a sequential-move outcome in equilibrium in an endogenous timing game when 
environmental externality is significant. This result sharply contrasts the previous literature in 
mixed duopolies without environmental externality. For example, Pal (1998) showed that firms 
in mixed duopolies decide simultaneously when competing in prices. However, price 
competition with environmental externality changes the competition structure in mixed 
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duopolies. Thus, the assumption of a simultaneous-move game under significant environmental 
externality may be problematic because a simultaneous-move outcome does not appear in 
equilibrium. 
Furthermore, we find that if environmental externality is insignificant, public leadership 
with optimal emission tax will be an equilibrium outcome in an endogenous timing game, 
yielding higher welfare than private leadership. Thus, welfare-improving public leadership is 
more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Once again, these results 
sharply contrast those in mixed duopolies without environmental externality whereby private 
leadership is more robust and more efficient (see, e.g., Pal, 1998; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2010; 
Capuano and De Feo, 2010). 
Remark In Appendix C and D, we provide a numerical example to confirm our main results 
examine other scenarios.8 In Appendix C, we compare the equilibrium outcomes between price 
and quantity competition, and show that most of the results under price competition can be 
reversed under quantity competition. In Appendix D, we consider the equilibrium outcomes in 
mixed duopolies under price competition by allowing an agency problem of managers in the 
public firm and show that some results can be affected by managers’ awareness on 
environmental concern. 
5  Endogenous choice on privatization policy 
We next examine the endogenous choice on privatization to discuss the welfare effect of 
privatization policy under price competition.  
Proposition 7 In the region of ݉݅݊ሼ݀ଷ, 	଼݀ሽ ൏ ݀ ൏ ݉ܽݔሼ݀ଷ, 	଼݀ሽ, a privatization policy does not 
change the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game, and a simultaneous-move outcome in price 
competition is robust unless two products are highly substitutable. 
Proof: Comparing the equilibrium in the endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies, 
we obtain the following results: (i) When ܾ ∈ ሺ0, 0.986ሻ, we have 0 ൏ ݀ଷ ൏ ଼݀ . Thus, a 
simultaneous-move outcome is still an equilibrium under privatization when ݀ଷ ൏ ݀ ൏ ଼݀. (ii) 
When ܾ ∈ ሺ0.986,1ሻ, we have 0 ൏ ଼݀ ൏ ݀ଷ. Thus, a sequential-move outcome is still an 
equilibrium under privatization when ଼݀ ൏ ݀ ൏ ݀ଷ. Q.E.D. 
                                                          
8 Recent research on the endogenous choice between price and quantity contract, see Balogh and Tasnadi 
(2012), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Naya (2015) and Din and Sun (2016). Regarding agency problem 
of the public firm, see Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006), Pal and Saha (2015), and Xu, et al. (2016). 
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This proposition indicates that privatization policy can change the equilibrium of an endogenous 
timing game when environmental damage is sufficiently small or large. In particular, when 
environmental damage is sufficiently small (large), a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) 
outcome will become a sequential-move (simultaneous-move) outcome under privatization. 
This supports the findings of the previous literature on price competition without environmental 
externalities that private duopoly firms decide sequentially (see Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990) 
whereas mixed duopoly firms decide simultaneously (see Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007). However, when 
environmental externalities are very significant, the results are surprisingly reversed. That is, 
mixed duopolies decide sequentially but private duopolies decide simultaneously after 
privatization. 
This proposition also indicates that the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game depends 
on the degree of product differentiation. If ݉݅݊ሼ݀ଷ, 	݀ଵ଴ሽ ൏ ݀ ൏ ݉ܽݔሼ݀ଷ, 	݀ଵ଴ሽ , the 
equilibrium will be a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome when two products are 
less (more) substitutable. For example, if the two products are almost homogeneous goods, 
privatization would result in a public leader becoming a private leader.  
Proposition 8 Privatization policy in an endogenous timing game lowers social welfare. 
Proof: Comparing the welfare in the endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies, we 
obtain the following results: (i) When ܾ ∈ ሺ0, 0.986ሻ, we have 0 ൏ ݀ଷ ൏ ଼݀. Thus, ܹ௅௉ ൏
ܹ஻ெ when 0 ൏ ݀ ൏ ݀଻; ܹ஻௉ ൏ ܹ஻ெwhen ݀ଷ ൏ ݀ ൏ ଼݀; and ܹ஻௉ ൏ ܹ௅ெ when ݀ ൐ ଼݀. 
(ii) When ܾ ൌ 	0.986, we have ݀ଷ ൌ ଼݀. Thus,  ܹ௅௉ ൏ ܹ஻ெ when 0 ൏ ݀ ൏ ݀ଷ ൌ ଼݀ and 
ܹ஻௉ ൏ ܹ௅ெ  when ݀ ൐ ݀ଷ ൌ ଼݀. (iii) When ܾ ∈ ሺ0.986,1ሻ, we have 0 ൏ ଼݀ ൏ ݀ଷ. Thus, 
ܹ௅௉ ൏ ܹ஻ெ when 0 ൏ ݀ ൏ ଼݀;	ܹ௅௉ ൏ ܹ௅ெ when ଼݀ ൏ ݀ ൏ ݀ଷ; and ܹ஻௉ ൏ ܹ௅ெ  when 
݀ ൐ ݀ଷ. Q.E.D. 
This proposition resembles the results of Fjell and Heywood (2004), who examined a mixed 
oligopoly with homogenous outputs, to find that without environmental externalities, 
privatization results in a public leader becoming a private leader and reduces both output and 
welfare. Furthermore, Heywood and Ye (2009) incorporated endogenous timing into a quantity 
setting game and demonstrated that privatization will always lower social welfare. We also 
confirmed that privatization will always lower social welfare in an endogenous timing game 
with environmental externalities and emission taxes. 
 
16 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper examines an endogenous timing game in private and mixed duopolies with price 
competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that public 
concerns on environmental quality affect the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game, and 
that this depends on the degree of environmental externalities. In particular, we show that in 
private duopolies, a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium under 
significant (insignificant) environmental externality; however, these results are reversed in 
mixed duopolies. As expected, the results under insignificant environmental externality are 
consistent with the results in the previous literature. However, under significant environmental 
externality, the results sharply contrast those in the previous literature. In fact, public concerns 
on environmental quality can reverse the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game. We also 
show that public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership 
is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium. Finally, we show that privatization can 
result in a public leader becoming a private leader, with welfare-worsening result. 
However, a need arises to examine the robustness of the results when there are multiple 
domestic or foreign private firms under the general functional forms. Subsidy policies on output 
and/or abatement activities are also important to evaluate the impact of emission tax and other 
environmental policies, such as trading emission permits and emission standards. The recent 
research interest in the endogenous choice between price and quantity contract is also a 
promising topic for future research. 
References 
Amir R, De Feo G (2014) Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly. International Journal of 
Game Theory 43: 629-658. 
Blogh TL, Tasnádi A (2012) Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?. Journal of 
Economics 106: 233-249. 
Bárcena-Ruiz JC (2007) Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition. Journal of 
Economics 91: 263-272. 
Bárcena-Ruiz JC, Garzón MB (2006) Mixed oligopoly and environmental policy. Spanish 
Economic Review 8: 139-160. 
Bárcena-Ruiz JC, Garzón MB (2010) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic 
firms. Portuguese Economic Journal 9: 97-113. 
Beladi H, Chao CC (2006) Does privatization improve the environment?. Economics Letters 93: 
343-347. 
Capuano C, De Feo G (2010) Privatization in oligopoly: the impact of the shadow cost of public 
funds. Rivista Italiana Degli Economisti 15: 175-208. 
17 
 
Cato S (2008) Privatization and the environment. Economics Bulletin 12: 1-10. 
Clo S, Ferraris M, Florio M (2016) Ownership and environmental regulation: evidence from the 
European electricity industry. Energy Economics DOI:10.1016/j.eneco. 
Din HR, Sun CH (2016) Combining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version 
in a mixed duopoly. Journal of Economics 118: 141-166. 
Fjell K, Heywood JS (2004) Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firm's moves: the 
relevance of privatization. Economics Letters 83: 411-416. 
Hamilton JH, Slutsky SM (1990) Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot 
equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 2: 29-46. 
Heywood JS, Ye G (2009) Privatisation and timing in a mixed oligopoly with both foreign and 
domestic firms. Australian Economic Papers 48: 320-332. 
Lu Y (2006) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors: the linear 
demand case. Journal of Economics 88: 49-68. 
Lu Y, Poddar S (2009) Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly and private duopoly –‘capacity-
then-quantity’ game: the linear demand case. Australian Economic Papers 48: 138-150. 
Matsumura T, Ogawa A (2010) On the robustness of private leadership in mixed duopoly. 
Australian Economic Papers 49: 149-160. 
Matsumura T, Ogawa A (2014) Corporate social responsibility or payoff asymmetry? A study 
of an endogenous timing game. Southern Economic Journal 81: 457-473. 
Naya JM (2015) Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model. Journal of Economics 116: 
165-174. 
Ohori S (2006) Optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopoly. 
Journal of Regulatory Economics 29: 225-233. 
Pal D (1998) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly. Economics Letters 61: 181-185. 
Pal R, Saha B (2014) Mixed duopoly and environment. Journal of Public Economic Theory 16: 
96-118. 
Pal R, Saha B (2015) Pollution tax, partial privatization and environment. Resource and Energy 
Economics 40: 19-35. 
Singh N, Vives X (1984) Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. RAND 
Journal of Economics 15: 546-554. 
Tomaru Y, Kiyono K (2009). 'Endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with increasing marginal 
costs', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 166: 591-613. 
Wang LFS, Wang J (2009) Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly. Economic 
Systems 33: 389-396. 
Xu L, Cho S, Lee SH (2016) Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand 
comparison. Economic Modelling 55: 73-82. 
Xu L, Lee SH (2015) Strategic privatization with tariffs and environmental taxes in an 
international mixed duopoly. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 56: 135-154. 
Appendix A: the values of ܕܑ, ܖܑ, and ܌ܑ 
݉ଵ ൌ ܣଶሺ49 ൅ 24ܾ െ 55ܾଶ െ 22ܾଷ ൅ 18ܾସ ൅ 4ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ሻ െ 2ܣሺ4 ൅ ܾ െ ܾଶሻሺ15 ൅ 4ܾ െ 15ܾଶ െ 3ܾଷ ൅ 3ܾସሻ݀ ൅
ሺ4 ൅ 2ܾ െ ܾଶሻሺ4 ൅ ܾ െ ܾଶሻଶሺ3 െ ܾଶሻ݀ଶ. 
݉ଶ ൌ ܣଶሺ324 െ 135ܾ െ 486ܾଶ ൅ 183ܾଷ ൅ 251ܾସ െ 79ܾହ െ 51ܾ଺ ൅ 11ܾ଻ ൅ 3଼ܾሻ െ ܣሺ3 െ ܾଶሻሺ9 െ 5ܾଶሻሺ18 െ
6ܾ െ 10ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ ܾସሻ݀ െ ܣሺ162 െ 108ܾ െ 270ܾଶ ൅ 168ܾଷ ൅ 145ܾସ െ 80ܾହ െ 28ܾ଺ ൅ 12ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻݐ ൅
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ݐሺ3 െ ܾଶሻሺ9 െ 5ܾଶሻሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻ݀ െ ሺ891 െ 27ܾ െ 1512ܾଶ ൅ 15ܾଷ ൅ 952ܾସ ൅ ܾହ െ
263ܾ଺ െ ܾ଻ ൅ 27଼ܾሻݐଶ. 
݉ଷ ൌ ሺ3 െ ܾଶሻሺ9 െ 5ܾଶሻሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻ݀ െ ܣሺ162 െ 108ܾ െ 270ܾଶ ൅ 168ܾଷ ൅ 145ܾସ െ
80ܾହ െ 28ܾ଺ ൅ 12ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ. 
݉ସ ൌ ܣሺ1134 െ 432ܾ െ 1818ܾଶ ൅ 522ܾଷ ൅ 1109ܾସ െ 208ܾହ െ 305ܾ଺ ൅ 27ܾ଻ ൅ 32଼ܾሻ ൅ ሺ3 ൅ 2ܾሻሺ3 െ 3ܾଶ ൅
ܾଷሻሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻ݀. 
݉ହ ൌ ܣሺ1134 െ 432ܾ െ 1962ܾଶ ൅ 678ܾଷ ൅ 1285ܾସ െ 406ܾହ െ 375ܾ଺ ൅ 109ܾ଻ ൅ 41଼ܾ െ 11ܾଽሻ ൅ ሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ
58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻሺ9 ൅ 6ܾ െ 7ܾଶ െ 5ܾଷ ൅ ܾସ ൅ ܾହሻ݀. 
݉଺ ൌ ܣଶሺ1285956 െ 1084752ܾ െ 3776220ܾଶ ൅ 3028752ܾଷ ൅ 4863888ܾସ െ 3596292ܾହ െ 3608784ܾ଺ ൅
2353080ܾ଻ ൅ 1697092଼ܾ െ 915862ܾଽ െ 520835ܾଵ଴ ൅ 211914ܾଵଵ ൅ 102262ܾଵଶ െ 26966ܾଵଷ െ
11761ܾଵସ ൅ 1454ܾଵହ ൅ 606ܾଵ଺ሻ െ 2ܣሺ3 െ ܾଶሻሺ9 െ 5ܾଶሻሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻሺ810 െ 594ܾ െ
1116ܾଶ ൅ 708ܾଷ ൅ 582ܾସ െ 278ܾହ െ 137ܾ଺ ൅ 36ܾ଻ ൅ 12଼ܾሻ݀ ൅ ሺ3 െ ܾଶሻሺ9 െ 5ܾଶሻሺ36 െ 6ܾ െ 29ܾଶ ൅
2ܾଷ ൅ 6ܾସሻሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻଶ݀ଶ. 
݉଻ ൌ ܣଶሺ1285956 െ 1084752ܾ െ 3776220ܾଶ ൅ 3215376ܾଷ ൅ 4646160ܾସ െ 4020084ܾହ െ 3082176ܾ଺ ൅
2747856ܾ଻ ൅ 1169620଼ܾ െ 1108630ܾଽ െ 240855ܾଵ଴ ൅ 263854ܾଵଵ ൅ 19230ܾଵଶ െ 34272ܾଵଷ ൅
1279ܾଵସ ൅ 1872ܾଵହ െ 241ܾଵ଺ሻ െ 2ܣሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻሺ21870 െ 16038ܾ െ 49572ܾଶ ൅
35964ܾଷ ൅ 43740ܾସ െ 31500ܾହ െ 18603ܾ଺ ൅ 13488ܾ଻ ൅ 3670଼ܾ െ 2826ܾଽ െ 203ܾଵ଴ ൅ 232ܾଵଵ െ
17ܾଵଶሻ݀ ൅ ሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻଶሺ972 െ 162ܾ െ 1647ܾଶ ൅ 234ܾଷ ൅ 1002ܾସ െ 108ܾହ െ
257ܾ଺ ൅ 16ܾ଻ ൅ 23଼ܾሻ݀ଶ. 
଼݉ ൌ ܣሺܣ െ 2݀ሻሺ1620 െ 756ܾ െ 2268ܾଶ ൅ 924ܾଷ ൅ 1116ܾସ െ 368ܾହ െ 220ܾ଺ ൅ 48ܾ଻ ൅ 13଼ܾሻ ൅ ሺ72 െ 6ܾ െ
58ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 11ܾସሻଶ݀ଶ. 
	݊ଵ ൌ 2ܣଶሺ17 െ 8ܾ െ 18ܾଶ ൅ 8ܾଷ ൅ 9ܾସ െ 4ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ െ 4ܣሺ3 െ 2ܾ െ ܾଶ ൅ ܾଷሻሺ5 ൅ ܾ െ 3ܾଶ െ ܾଷ ൅
ܾସሻ݀ ൅ ሺ54 െ 12ܾ െ 74ܾଶ ൅ 12ܾଷ ൅ 46ܾସ െ 8ܾହ െ 12ܾ଺ ൅ 2ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ଶ െ 4ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ1 െ ܾሻሺ1 ൅ ܾሻݐ ൅
2ሺ48 െ 2ܾ െ 54ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅ 28ܾସ െ 8ܾ଺ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ݐ െ ሺ44 െ 50ܾଶ ൅ 28ܾସ െ 8ܾ଺ ൅ ଼ܾሻݐଶ. 
݊ଶ ൌ ܣଶሺ2 െ ܾሻଶሺ196 െ 328ܾଶ ൅ 228ܾସ െ 88ܾ଺ ൅ 19଼ܾ െ 2ܾଵ଴ሻ ൅ 2ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ480 െ 196ܾ െ 844ܾଶ ൅ 328ܾଷ ൅
612ܾସ െ 228ܾହ െ 248ܾ଺ ൅ 88ܾ଻ ൅ 56଼ܾ െ 19ܾଽ െ 6ܾଵ଴ ൅ 2ܾଵଵሻ݀ െ ሺ3072 െ 960ܾ െ 6268ܾଶ ൅
1688ܾଷ ൅ 6172ܾସ െ 1224ܾହ െ 3916ܾ଺ ൅ 496ܾ଻ ൅ 1732଼ܾ െ 112ܾଽ െ 545ܾଵ଴ ൅ 12ܾଵଵ ൅ 118ܾଵଶ െ
16ܾଵସ ൅ ܾଵ଺ሻ݀ଶ. 
݊ଷ ൌ ܣଶሺ21 െ 10ܾ െ 18ܾଶ ൅ 8ܾଷ ൅ 9ܾସ െ 4ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ െ 2ܣሺ21 െ 10ܾ െ 18ܾଶ ൅ 8ܾଷ ൅ 9ܾସ െ 4ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅
ܾ଻ሻ݀ ൅ ሺ65 െ 10ܾ െ 68ܾଶ ൅ 8ܾଷ ൅ 37ܾସ െ 4ܾହ െ 10ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ଶ.	
݊ସ ൌ 2ܣଶሺ17 െ 8ܾ െ 18ܾଶ ൅ 8ܾଷ ൅ 9ܾସ െ 4ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ െ 4ܣሺ3 െ 2ܾ െ ܾଶ ൅ ܾଷሻሺ5 ൅ ܾ െ 3ܾଶ െ ܾଷ ൅
ܾସሻ݀ ൅ ሺ54 െ 12ܾ െ 74ܾଶ ൅ 12ܾଷ ൅ 46ܾସ െ 8ܾହ െ 12ܾ଺ ൅ 2ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ଶ. 
݊ହ ൌ ܣଶሺ17 െ 8ܾ െ 10ܾଶ ൅ 4ܾଷ ൅ ܾସሻ െ 2ܣሺ15 െ 7ܾ െ 8ܾଶ ൅ 3ܾଷ ൅ ܾସሻ݀ ൅ ሺ27 െ 6ܾ െ 21ܾଶ ൅ 2ܾଷ ൅
5ܾସሻ݀ଶ െ 2ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ1 െ ܾሻሺ1 ൅ ܾሻݐ ൅ 2ሺ24 െ ܾ െ 19ܾଶ ൅ ܾଷ ൅ 4ܾସሻ݀ݐ െ ሺ22 െ 17ܾଶ ൅ 4ܾସሻݐଶ.	
݊଺ ൌ ܣଶሺ2 െ ܾሻଶሺ49 െ 58ܾଶ ൅ 20ܾସ െ 2ܾ଺ሻ ൅ 2ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ120 െ 49ܾ െ 155ܾଶ ൅ 58ܾଷ ൅ 61ܾସ െ 20ܾହ െ 8ܾ଺ ൅
2ܾ଻ሻ݀ െ ሺ768 െ 240ܾ െ 1087ܾଶ ൅ 310ܾଷ ൅ 571ܾସ െ 122ܾହ െ 140ܾ଺ ൅ 16ܾ଻ ൅ 14଼ܾሻ݀ଶ.	
݊଻ ൌ 2ܣଶሺ68 െ 32ܾ െ 80ܾଶ ൅ 40ܾଷ ൅ 24ܾସ െ 12ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ െ 4ܣሺ6 െ 4ܾ െ 2ܾଶ ൅ ܾଷሻሺ10 ൅ 2ܾ െ 8ܾଶ ൅
ܾସሻ݀ ൅ ሺ216 െ 48ܾ െ 296ܾଶ ൅ 72ܾଷ ൅ 120ܾସ െ 24ܾହ െ 18ܾ଺ ൅ 2ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ଶ െ 8ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ2 െ ܾଶሻݐ ൅
2ሺ2 െ ܾଶሻሺ96 െ 4ܾ െ 72ܾଶ ൅ 16ܾସ െ ܾ଺ሻ݀ݐ െ ሺ2 െ ܾଶሻଶሺ44 െ 14ܾଶ ൅ ܾସሻݐଶ. 
଼݊ ൌ ܣଶሺ2 െ ܾሻଶሺ784 െ 704ܾଶ ൅ 204ܾସ െ 24ܾ଺ ൅ ଼ܾሻ െ 2ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ1920 െ 784ܾ െ 1696ܾଶ ൅ 704ܾଷ ൅
472ܾସ െ 204ܾହ െ 52ܾ଺ ൅ 24ܾ଻ ൅ 2଼ܾ െ ܾଽሻ݀ ൅ ሺ12288 െ 3840ܾ െ 15856ܾଶ ൅ 3392ܾଷ ൅ 8368ܾସ െ
944ܾହ െ 2388ܾ଺ ൅ 104ܾ଻ ൅ 380଼ܾ െ 4ܾଽ െ 31ܾଵ଴ ൅ ܾଵଶሻ݀ଶ. 
݊ଽ ൌ ܣଶሺ84 െ 40ܾ െ 96ܾଶ ൅ 48ܾଷ ൅ 28ܾସ െ 14ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ െ 2ܣሺ84 െ 40ܾ െ 96ܾଶ ൅ 48ܾଷ ൅ 28ܾସ െ
14ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ݀ ൅ ሺ260 െ 40ܾ െ 328ܾଶ ൅ 48ܾଷ ൅ 132ܾସ െ 14ܾହ െ 20ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ଶ. 
݊ଵ଴ ൌ 2ܣଶሺ68 െ 32ܾ െ 80ܾଶ ൅ 40ܾଷ ൅ 24ܾସ െ 12ܾହ െ 2ܾ଺ ൅ ܾ଻ሻ െ 4ܣሺ6 െ 4ܾ െ 2ܾଶ ൅ ܾଷሻሺ10 ൅ 2ܾ െ 8ܾଶ ൅
ܾସሻ݀ ൅ ሺ216 െ 48ܾ െ 296ܾଶ ൅ 72ܾଷ ൅ 120ܾସ െ 24ܾହ െ 18ܾ଺ ൅ 2ܾ଻ ൅ ଼ܾሻ݀ଶ. 
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݀ଵ ൌ ஺ሺଵି௕
మሻ
ଵଶା଻௕ି଺௕మିଶ௕యା௕ర. 
݀ଶ ൌ ஺ሺଵ଺ଶିଵ଴଼௕ିଶ଻଴௕
మାଵ଺଼௕యାଵସହ௕రି଼଴௕ఱିଶ଼௕లାଵଶ௕ళା௕ఴሻ
ሺଷି௕మሻሺଽିହ௕మሻሺ଻ଶି଺௕ିହ଼௕మାଶ௕యାଵଵ௕రሻ . 
݀ଷ ൌ ܣሺ2405700 ൅ 568620ܾ െ 4512996ܾଶ െ 1384128ܾଷ െ 765234ܾସ ൅ 656550ܾହ ൅ 9694881ܾ଺ ൅
1304366ܾ଻ െ 12397773଼ܾ െ 2198008ܾଽ ൅ 8283974ܾଵ଴ ൅ 1540918ܾଵଵ െ 3405551ܾଵଶ െ 608600ܾଵଷ ൅
895524ܾଵସ ൅ 140930ܾଵହ െ 148072ܾଵ଺ െ 17922ܾଵ଻ ൅ 14169ܾଵ଼ ൅ 970ܾଵଽ െ 606ܾଶ଴ሻ/ሺሺ3 െ
ܾଶሻሺ2566080 ൅ 1846800ܾ െ 6043248ܾଶ െ 5765256ܾଷ ൅ 4368258ܾସ ൅ 7474866ܾହ ൅ 767313ܾ଺ െ
5196596ܾ଻ െ 3121668଼ܾ ൅ 2075716ܾଽ ൅ 2146562ܾଵ଴ െ 468206ܾଵଵ െ 753879ܾଵଶ ൅ 52350ܾଵଷ ൅
149403ܾଵସ െ 1516ܾଵହ െ 15919ܾଵ଺ െ 110ܾଵ଻ ൅ 714ܾଵ଼ሻሻ. 
݀ସ ൌ ܣሺ2405700 ൅ 11859372ܾ െ 3315492ܾଶ െ 43835256ܾଷ െ 4935546ܾସ ൅ 70972830ܾହ ൅ 15294213ܾ଺ െ
66159898ܾ଻ െ 15838541଼ܾ ൅ 39218870ܾଽ ൅ 8847024ܾଵ଴ െ 15376910ܾଵଵ െ 2886850ܾଵଶ ൅
4001238ܾଵଷ ൅ 530575ܾଵସ െ 668514ܾଵହ െ 43655ܾଵ଺ ൅ 65238ܾଵ଻ െ 587ܾଵ଼ െ 2836ܾଵଽ ൅ 241ܾଶ଴ሻ/
ሺ7698240 ൅ 16831152ܾ െ 19498320ܾଶ െ 61593696ܾଷ ൅ 14977710ܾସ ൅ 98506134ܾହ ൅ 3533013ܾ଺ െ
90528918ܾ଻ െ 13573085଼ܾ ൅ 52840622ܾଽ ൅ 10124404ܾଵ଴ െ 20398162ܾଵଵ െ 3889498ܾଵଶ ൅
5235094ܾଵଷ ൅ 837139ܾଵସ െ 866342ܾଵହ െ 92743ܾଵ଺ ൅ 84346ܾଵ଻ ൅ 3305ܾଵ଼ െ 3696ܾଵଽ ൅ 133ܾଶ଴ሻ. 
݀ହ ൌ ଶ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଵି௕ሻሺଵା௕ሻସ଼ିଶ௕ିହସ௕మାଶ௕యାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ. 
݀଺ ൌ ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଵି௕ሻሺଵା௕ሻଶସି௕ିଵଽ௕మା௕యାସ௕ర. 
݀଻ ൌ ସ஺ሺଶି௕ሻଽ଺ିସ௕ି଻ଶ௕మାଵ଺௕రି௕ల. 
଼݀ ൌ ܣሺ11264 െ 28264ܾଶ ൅ 31556ܾସ െ 20762ܾ଺ ൅ 8819଼ܾ െ 2473ܾଵ଴ ൅ 444ܾଵଶ െ 46ܾଵସ ൅ 2ܾଵ଺ሻ/ሺ19008 ൅
3872ܾ െ 46920ܾଶ െ 9328ܾଷ ൅ 52084ܾସ ൅ 10264ܾହ െ 34146ܾ଺ െ 6692ܾ଻ ൅ 14387଼ܾ ൅ 2784ܾଽ െ
3945ܾଵ଴ െ 736ܾଵଵ ൅ 672ܾଵଶ ൅ 114ܾଵଷ െ 62ܾଵସ െ 8ܾଵହ ൅ 2ܾଵ଺ሻ. 
݀ଽ ൌ ܣሺ2 െ ܾሻሺ70400 െ 11776ܾଶ െ 172288ܾସ ൅ 249152ܾ଺ െ 177584଼ܾ ൅ 78320ܾଵ଴ െ 22728ܾଵଶ ൅
4340ܾଵସ െ 520ܾଵ଺ ൅ 35ܾଵ଼ െ ܾଶ଴ሻ/ሺ450560 െ 70400ܾ െ 690944ܾଶ ൅ 11776ܾଷ ൅ 302464ܾସ ൅
172288ܾହ ൅ 135168ܾ଺ െ 249152ܾ଻ െ 232256଼ܾ ൅ 177584ܾଽ ൅ 134064ܾଵ଴ െ 78320ܾଵଵ െ 44536ܾଵଶ ൅
22728ܾଵଷ ൅ 9128ܾଵସ െ 4340ܾଵହ െ 1120ܾଵ଺ ൅ 520ܾଵ଻ ൅ 74ܾଵ଼ െ 35ܾଵଽ െ 2ܾଶ଴ ൅ ܾଶଵሻ. 
Appendix B: the optimal prices, abatements and quantities 
Simultaneous-move game in private duopolies 
When ݀ ൐ ݀ଵ, we have: 
݌଴஻௉ ൌ ݌1ܤܲ ൌ ܣሺ7൅2ܾെ5ܾ
2െܾ3൅ܾ4ሻ൅ሺ4൅5ܾെܾ3ሻ݀
11൅7ܾെ5ܾ2െ2ܾ3൅ܾ4 , ܽ଴஻௉ ൌ ܽଵ஻௉ ൌ
ଵଶௗିሺଵି௕ሻሺ஺ሺଵା௕ሻିୠୢሺ଻ା௕ି௕మሻሻ
ଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕ర ,  
ݍ଴஻௉ ൌ ݍଵ஻௉ ൌ ሺସା௕ି௕
మሻሺ஺ିௗሻ
ଵଵା଻௕ିହ௕మିଶ௕యା௕ర.  
When ݀ ൑ ݀ଵ, ݌଴஻௉ ൌ ݌1ܤܲ ൌ ܣሺ2െܾ
2ሻ
3൅ܾെܾ2 , ܽ଴஻௉ ൌ ܽଵ஻௉ ൌ 0, ݍ଴஻௉ ൌ ݍଵ஻௉ ൌ
஺
ଷା௕ି௕మ.  
Sequential-move game in private duopolies 
When ݀ ൐ ݀ଶ, we have: 
݌଴௅௉ ൌ ௠రଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ,  
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݌ଵ௅௉ ൌ 	 ௠ఱଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ,  
ܽ଴௅௉ ൌ ܽଵ௅௉ ൌ ௠యଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ, 
ݍ଴௅௉ ൌ ሺଷି௕
మሻሺଷି௕ି௕మሻሺ଻ଶି଺௕ିହ଼௕మାଶ௕యାଵଵ௕రሻሺ஺ିௗሻ
ଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ,  
ݍଵ௅௉ ൌ ሺଽିଷ௕ିସ௕
మା௕యሻሺ଻ଶି଺௕ିହ଼௕మାଶ௕యାଵଵ௕రሻሺ஺ିௗሻ
ଶሺ଼ଽଵିଶ଻௕ିଵହଵଶ௕మାଵହ௕యାଽହଶ௕రା௕ఱିଶ଺ଷ௕లି௕ళାଶ଻௕ఴሻ.                         
When ݀ ൑ ݀ଶ, ݌଴௅௉ ൌ ଷ஺ሺଶି௕
మሻሺଷି௕ି௕మሻ
ଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕ర , ݌ଵ௅௉ ൌ 	
஺ሺଶି௕మሻሺଽିଷ௕ିସ௕మା௕యሻ
ଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕ర , ܽ଴௅௉ ൌ ܽଵ௅௉ ൌ 0,  
ݍ଴௅௉ ൌ ஺ሺଷି௕ି௕
మሻ
ଽିହ௕మ , ݍଵ௅௉ ൌ
஺ሺଽିଷ௕ିସ௕మା௕యሻ
ଶ଻ିଶସ௕మାହ௕ర .                                    
Simultaneous-move game in mixed duopolies 
When ݀ ൐ ݀ହ, we have: 
݌଴஻ெ ൌ ܣሺ22െ2ܾെ24ܾ
2െ6ܾ3൅17ܾ4൅4ܾ5െ6ܾ6െܾ7൅ܾ8ሻ൅22݀൅ܾ݀ሺ2െ26ܾ൅6ܾ2൅11ܾ3െ4ܾ4െ2ܾ5൅ܾ6ሻ
44െ50ܾ2൅28ܾ4െ8ܾ6൅ܾ8 , 
݌ଵ஻ெ ൌ 	 ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଵସିଵସ௕
మା଺௕రି௕లሻାሺଵା௕ሻሺଵ଺ିଶ௕ିଶ଴௕మା଺௕యାଵ଴௕రିସ௕ఱିଶ௕లା௕ళሻௗ
ସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ ,  
ܽ଴஻ெ ൌ ݀, ܽଵ஻ெ ൌ ଶ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺ௕ିଵሻሺଵା௕ሻାሺସ଼ିଶ௕ିହସ௕
మାଶ௕యାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴሻௗ
ସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ ,      
ݍ଴஻ெ ൌ ሺ஺ିௗሻሺଶଶିଵସ௕ିଵ଼௕
మାଵସ௕యା଻௕రି଺௕ఱି௕లା௕ళሻ
ସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ , ݍଵ஻ெ ൌ
ሺ஺ିௗሻሺଶି௕ሻሺ଼ିସ௕మା௕రሻ
ସସିହ଴௕మାଶ଼௕రି଼௕లା௕ఴ.                          
When ݀ ൑ ݀ହ, ݌଴஻ெ ൌ ஺ሺଷିଶ௕
మି௕యା௕రሻାሺଵି௕ሻሺଷିଶ௕మሻௗ
଺ିସ௕మା௕ర , ݌ଵ஻ெ ൌ 	
ሺଶି௕మሻሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗሻ
଺ିସ௕మା௕ర ,  
ܽ଴஻ெ ൌ ݀, ܽଵ஻ெ ൌ 0, ݍ଴஻ெ ൌ ஺ሺଷିଶ௕ି௕
మା௕యሻିሺଵି௕ሻሺଷି௕మሻௗ
଺ିସ௕మା௕ర , ݍଵ஻ெ ൌ
஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗ
଺ିସ௕మା௕ర .  
Sequential-move game with public leadership in mixed duopolies 
When	݀ ൐ ݀଺, we have: 
݌଴௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଵଵିଷ௕ି଻௕
మାଶ௕రሻାሺଵଵାଷ௕ିଵ଴௕మାଶ௕రሻௗ
ଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర , 
݌ଵ௅ெ ൌ 	 ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺ଻ିହ௕
మା௕రሻାሺଵା௕ሻሺ଼ି௕ି଺௕మା௕యା௕రሻௗ
ଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర , 
ܽ଴௅ெ ൌ ݀, ܽଵ௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺ௕ିଵሻሺଵା௕ሻାሺଶସି௕ିଵଽ௕
మା௕యାସ௕రሻௗ
ଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర , 
ݍ଴௅ெ ൌ ሺ஺ିௗሻሺଵଵିହ௕ି଺௕
మାଶ௕యା௕రሻ
ଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర , ݍଵ௅ெ ൌ
ሺ஺ିௗሻሺଶି௕ሻమሺଶା௕ሻ
ଶଶିଵ଻௕మାସ௕ర .                          
When ݀ ൑ ݀଺, we have: 
݌଴௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଽିଶ௕ି଻௕
మାଶ௕రሻାሺଷି௕ି௕మሻሺଷିଶ௕మሻௗ
ଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ , ݌ଵ௅ெ ൌ 	
ሺଶି௕మሻሺ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଷି௕మሻା௕ሺଷି௕ି௕మሻௗሻ
ଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ , 
ܽ଴௅ெ ൌ ݀ , ܽଵ௅ெ ൌ 0 , ݍ଴௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଽିସ௕ି଺௕
మାଶ௕యା௕రሻିሺଷି௕మሻሺଷି௕ି௕మሻௗ
ଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ , 
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ݍଵ௅ெ ൌ ஺ሺଶି௕ሻሺଷି௕
మሻା௕ሺଷି௕ି௕మሻௗ
ଶሺଽି଼௕మାଶ௕రሻ .        
Sequential-move game with private leadership in mixed duopolies 
When	݀ ൐ ݀଻, we have: 
଴ܲிெ ൌ ஺ሺସସିସ௕ିଷସ௕
మା଼௕యାସ௕రି௕ఱሻାሺସସାସ௕ିଷ଼௕మି଼௕యାଵଶ௕రା௕ఱି௕లሻௗ
ሺଶି௕మሻሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻ ,  
ଵܲிெ ൌ 	ܣሺ2െܾሻሺ28െ12ܾ
2൅ܾ4ሻ൅ሺ32൅28ܾെ48ܾ2െ12ܾ3൅14ܾ4൅ܾ5െܾ6ሻ݀
ሺ2െܾ2ሻሺ44െ14ܾ2൅ܾ4ሻ ,  
ܽ଴ிெ ൌ ݀, ܽଵிெ ൌ 4ܣሺܾെ2ሻ൅ሺ96െ4ܾെ72ܾ
2൅16ܾ4െܾ6ሻ݀
ሺ2െܾ2ሻሺ44െ14ܾ2൅ܾ4ሻ ,                              
ݍ଴ிெ ൌ ሺ஺ିௗሻሺସସିଶ଼௕ିଶଶ௕
మାଵଶ௕యାଶ௕రି௕ఱሻ
ሺଶି௕మሻሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻ , ݍଵிெ ൌ
ሺ஺ିௗሻሺଶି௕ሻሺ଼ି௕మሻ
ሺଶି௕మሻሺସସିଵସ௕మା௕రሻ.                     
When ݀ ൑ ݀଻, ଴ܲிெ ൌ ஺ሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕యሻାሺଵି௕ሻሺ଺ିସ௕మା௕రሻௗଵଶି଼௕మା௕ర , ଵܲிெ ൌ 	 ሺ4െܾ
2ሻሺܣሺ2െܾሻ൅ሺ1െܾሻܾ݀ሻ
12െ8ܾ2൅ܾ4 , ܽ଴
ிெ ൌ ݀,  
ܽଵிெ ൌ 0, ݍ଴ிெ ൌ ஺ሺ଺ିସ௕ିଶ௕
మା௕యሻିଶሺଵି௕ሻሺଷି௕మሻௗ
ଵଶି଼௕మା௕ర , ݍଵிெ ൌ
஺ሺଶି௕ሻାሺଵି௕ሻ௕ௗ
଺ି௕మ .  
Appendix C 
We compare the equilibrium outcomes between price competition and quantity competition by 
using a numerical example with A=10 and d=1. We then show that most of the results under 
price competition can be reversed under quantity competition. The followings are the summary 
of the findings, which are supported by figures. 
Proposition C1: In private duopolies, the optimal emission tax is always lower than the marginal 
environmental damage. However, the tax level in a sequential-move game under price (quantity) 
competition is lower (higher) than that in simultaneous-move game. 
Proposition C2: In private duopolies, environmental damage and social welfare under price 
(quantity) competition are lower (higher) in a sequential-move game. 
Proposition C3: In private duopolies, two sequential-move outcomes, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,2ሻ  and 
ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,1ሻ, are the unique equilibrium under price competition while two simultaneous-move 
outcomes, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,1ሻ  and ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ2,2ሻ,  are the unique equilibrium under quantity 
competition when 0 < b < 0.897 . 
Proposition C4: In mixed duopolies, the optimal emission tax is always lower than the marginal 
environmental damage. However, the tax level in a public (private) leadership game under price 
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competition is the highest (lowest) while that in a sequential-move game under quantity 
competition is higher than that in a simultaneous-move game. 
Proposition C5: In mixed duopolies under price competition, environmental damage and 
social welfare are the highest (lowest) in a public (private) leadership game. However, in 
mixed duopolies under quantity competition, environmental damage is the highest (lowest) in 
a private (public) leadership game while social welfare in sequential-move game is higher th
an that in a simultaneous-move game.  
Proposition C6: In mixed duopolies, one simultaneous-move outcome, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,1ሻ, is the 
unique equilibrium under price competition while one sequential-move outcome, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,2ሻ, 
is the unique equilibrium under quantity competition. 
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	ߨ 
ߨ଴஻௉ ൌ ߨଵ஻௉ ൏ ߨ଴௅௉ ൏ ߨଵ௅௉ ߨଵ௅ெ ൏ ߨଵ஻ெ ൏ ߨଵிெ 
W 
ܹ௅௉ ൏ ܹ஻௉ ܹிெ ൏ ܹ஻ெ ൏ ܹ௅ெ 
 Quantity Competition 
Private duopoly Mixed duopoly 
t 
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ߨ 
　 
 
ߨଵ௅௉ ൏ ߨ଴௅௉ ழவ ߨ଴஼௉ ൌ ߨଵ஼௉ when ܾ
ழ
வ 0.897 ߨଵிெ ൏ ߨଵ஼ெ ൏ ߨଵ௅ெ 
W 
ܹ஼௉ ൏ ܹ௅௉ ܹ஼ெ ൏ ܹ௅ெ ൏ ܹிெ 
Appendix D 
We consider the equilibrium outcomes in mixed duopolies under price competition by allowing 
an agency problem of public firm, in which the objective function of the public firm is defined 
as ܩ ൌ ܥܵ ൅ ߨ଴ ൅ ߨଵ ൅ ܶ െ ߩܧܦ where ߩሺ൒ 0ሻ represents the political pressure of interest 
group or managers’ awareness on environmental concern in the public firm. That is, ߩ ൏ 1 
implies that managers are more development-oriented while ߩ ൐ 1 implies that managers are 
more environment-friendly9. Notice that ߩ ൌ 1 represents a benchmark case without agency 
problem and thus the public firm maximizes social welfare.  
For a comparable analysis, we use the same numerical example in Appendix C where A=10 and 
d=1. We also describe main outcomes with b ൌ ଵଶ and provide the figures. Then, in mixed 
duopolies, the outcomes of three cases are provided as follows:  
First, a simultaneous-move game (BM) yields that: 
ݐ஻ெ ൌ ଻ሺଵ଻଻ିଶ଴ఘሻଶ଼ଶ଻ , ߨଵ஻ெ ൌ
ଵହଽସ଺ଵ଼଼ଵାସ଴ఘሺଵ଻଼ଵ଴ହାଶ଺ଽଽఘሻ
ଵହଽ଼ଷ଼ହ଼ , ܧܦ஻ெ ൌ
ଵ଻଴ହ଻ିଷଶହଷఘ
ଶ଼ଶ଻ , and 
ܹ஻ெ ൌ ଵ଼ଵ଻ଶଷାሺହ଺଺଺ିଷଶଵଵఘሻఘହ଺ହସ . 
                                                          
9 For positive values in the following analysis, we assume that 0 ൑ ߩ ൑ 2.819. 
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Second, a sequential-move game with public leadership (LM) yields that: 
ݐ௅ெ ൌ ଻ଵ଺, ߨଵ௅ெ ൌ
ଷସ଼଼ଵ଼ଷା଻ଶ଴ఘሺଶ଻଻ାସఘሻ
ଷ଺ଽ଺଺ସ , ܧܦ௅ெ ൌ
ଷ଼଼ଷି଼ଶସఘ
଺଴଼ , and  
ܹ௅ெ ൌ ଷ଼଼଺଻ା଼ଶସሺଶିఘሻఘଵଶଵ଺ . 
Third, a sequential-move game with private leadership or public followership (FM) yields that: 
ݐிெ ൌ ଵଷଵଶିଶଶହఘସହସଷ ,ߨଵிெ ൌ
ସଷଶ଺ଷ଻ଶ଴଴ାఘሺଵଽସଶ଻଺ଽ଺ାଶ଼ଷଵ଴ଽఘሻ
ସଵଶ଻଻଺ଽ଼ ,ܧܦிெ ൌ
ଶሺଵଷଵଽ଺ିଶ଺ଷ଻ఘሻ
ସହସଷ , and 
ܹிெ ൌ ଵ଴଴଴଻଺଼ାଽሺଷଷ଴ଶିଶ଴ଵଵఘሻఘଷଵ଼଴ଵ . 
Fig. D.1 provides the equilibrium results in three cases. Then, we obtain that the rank of 
optimal emission taxes is not affected by ߩ and thus, Proposition 4 still holds. 
Proposition  D 1 :  In mixed duopolies, the optimal emission tax is lower than marginal 
environmental damage, but its level in a public (private) leadership game is the highest 
(lowest). 
However, the ranks of environmental damage and social welfare depend on the size of ߩ, and thus 
the equilibrium outcomes of endogenous timing game in mixed duopolies are also affected by ߩ. 
In particular, (i) ܧܦிெ ൏ ܧܦ஻ெ ൑ ܧܦ௅ெ  when 0 ൑ ߩ ൑ 1.725 ; ܧܦிெ ൏ ܧܦ௅ெ ൏ ܧܦ஻ெ 
otherwise; and (ii) ܹிெ ൏ ܹ஻ெ ൑ ܹ௅ெ  when 0.624 ൑ ߩ ൑ 2.595; ܹிெ ൏ ܹ௅ெ ൏ ܹ஻ெ 
otherwise.  
Proposition D2: In mixed duopolies, social welfare in a public leadership game is the highest 
when 0.624 ൑ ߩ ൑ 2.595 while environmental damage in a public leadership game is the 
highest when 0 ൑ ߩ ൑ 1.725. 
It states that (i) when the managers of public firm are much oriented to development, i.e., 0 
൑ ߩ ൑ 0.624, a simultaneous-move game yields the highest social welfare but its environmental 
damage is lower than that in a public leadership game; (ii) when the managers of public firm are 
much concerned on environments, i.e., 1.725 ൑ ߩ ൑ 2.595, a public leadership game yields the 
highest social welfare but its environmental damage is lower than that in a simultaneous-move 
game. 
   Finally, comparing the profit ranks of the private firm, we have: ߨଵிெ ൐ ߨଵ஻ெ ൐ ߨଵ௅ெ. 
Proposition D3: In mixed duopolies, one simultaneous-move outcome, ሺ ଴ܶ, ଵܶሻ ൌ ሺ1,1ሻ, is the 
unique equilibrium for any ߩ. 
Hence, a simultaneous-move game is the unique equilibrium of an endogenous timing game in 
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mixed duopolies but it is welfare-inferior to a public leadership game when 0.624 ൑ ߩ ൑ 1.725, 
t ED
ݐிெ ൏ ݐ஻ெ ൏ ݐ௅ெ ܧܦிெ ൏ ܧܦ஻ெ ൏൐ܧܦ
௅ெ 
࣊ W
ߨଵ௅ெ ൏ ߨଵ஻ெ ൏ ߨଵிெ ܹிெ ൏ ܹ஻ெ ൏൐ܹ
௅ெ 
Fig. D1 The equilibrium results in a mixed duopoly 
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